Not a terrorist - or not fit for government?

In Part 1, we looked at the enterprising Nalinee Taveesin, PM’s new “Office Minister” whose main qualification for her new job appears to be an ability to do brisk business with the wretched African dictator Robert Mugabe.

Now, onto Natthawut Saikua, the core red-shirt leader assigned to be the new Deputy Minister for Agriculture. While Nalinee’s claim to current fame is being on a US Treasury Department blacklist, Natthawut’s badge of honor is the charge of terrorism lodged against him by the previous government.

In most countries, a charge of terrorism would be enough to end any political career. In Thailand it doesn’t prevent bringing the accused into the government – and that leads to a simple question: does a charge of terrorism have any meaning in the kingdom these days?

We can talk about the mundane politics behind Natthawut’s promotion all we want: payback for the role he and other red shirts had played in helping Pheu Thai regain power, and so on. But still, wouldn’t something as serious as a terrorism charge in itself be enough to temper ordinary political maneuvering?

To Natthawut’s opponents, the charges are serious and real. The man is on record for urging his supporters to use arson as a political weapon, magnanimously adding, “I will take responsibility” for any fallout. Not long after those words were uttered, Bangkok was set ablaze – but neither Natthawut nor any other red shirt leader assumed responsibility. By standards of Western justice, the case against Natthawut for inciting arson or violence would be fairly strong – but did his action justify a terrorism charge? 

To his red-shirt supporters and to other opponents of the establishment, the answer is No. They believe the terrorism and other charges against Natthawut and all other red-shirt leaders are trumped-up and politically motivated; same as they would have been under a dictatorial regime trying to oppress those fighting for justice and democracy.

But is the terrorism charge, in fact, justified?

Natthawut, a core UDD leader, played a key role in the protests of 2010. According to The Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, ‘Descent into Chaos’, “UDD claims to be a peaceful mass mobilization were undermined by presence of highly skilled and armed groups, including the ‘Black Shirts,’ who were responsible for a number of attacks against soldiers and civilians.”

So Natthawut was a leader in an organization responsible for violent attacks on security forces and civilians. UDD may well deny this, but these attacks took place, and facts speak for themselves. What was Natthawut’s relationship with the Black Shirts? What did he know? And whether he organized them or not, as a UDD leader, shouldn’t he be held responsible for their actions?

Those who deny that the Black Shirts were in any way organized by the UDD have no answer as to why a ‘peaceful’ organization made no moves whatsover against these murderers in their midst. When the Black Shirts emerged on April 10, did Natthawut make every effort to bring the chaos under control? Did he explicitly repudiate the Black Shirts and the ensuing violence among his ranks? Did he reaffirm his commitment to nothing but a peaceful political struggle as stated in the English-language red-shirt placards?

Hardly. As the 2010 protest descended into violence, Natthawut was right there in the center of the storm, urging further conflict at every stage, constantly egging on his supporters to “fight.” In fact, listening to Natthawut speak, one can see his modus operandi is usually incitement and agitation, his language peppered with words that refer to violent retribution. There was more than one incitement to arson. On April 8, 2010, Natthawut, according to HRW, “suggested that the Red Shirts should run into shopping centers and loot and burn them if they were ‘spooked’ by the army attempting to disperse them.”

And it didn’t end in 2010. During the 2011 election campaign, Nutthawut again urged supporters at a Yingluck Shinawatra election rally to ”attack” if Yingluck was not allowed to become prime minister. “Brothers and sisters… Attack, attack! Let’s get this over with and finish the fight,” he exhorted the crowds.

“Fight!” “Attack!” Even in a relatively developed and stable democracy, a grassroots leader using these words would raise a few eyebrows. But it would generally be assumed that the speaker is likely urging some form of non-violent political action. But in a situation where a leader of an organization with a document record of violence constantly uses the language of violence in his speeches, what is he actually urging his supporters to do? Does “attack” mean physically assaulting security personnel or political opponents? Considering UDD’s track record, is it really a stretch to assume it does?

So on the one hand, Natthawut, throughout his speeches, incites arson, urges violence and encouraging illegal actions against the state. On the other, he remains a leader of an organization accused by both the Thai justice system and a prominent international human rights organization of organized violence.

At the end of the day, it is for the Thai justice system to decide whether Natthawut is, in fact, a terrorist, but based on facts at hand, the charge against him does not appear to be purely political, but rather based on his concrete actions as a UDD core leader. 

Unfortunately, for Natthawut’s supporters and opponents of the establishment, none of this matters. The gulf between those who are terrified of what it means to have a man like Natthawut in any position of power and those who view the serious charges against him with absolute contempt exemplifies how poisonous and irrational the political environment in Thailand has become. 

Yingluck’s new cabinet member indeed represents the scorched earth of the Thai political landscape today.

Blood diamonds are a girl's best friend!

In the wake of PM Yingluck’s recent cabinet reshuffle (well, Thaksin’s recent cabinet reshuffle, but we’ll get to that…), two names have been in the news. One is the previously little known Nalinee Taveesin, promoted to be one of PM’s new Office Ministers responsible for integrating and coordinating international trade, and the other is the much-better known red-shirt “firebrand” (literally), Natthawut Saikua, the new Deputy Minister for…Agriculture, of all things.

First, the lady. Controversy has swirled around Nalinee from day 1 due to the small matter of her being on the US Treasury Department blacklist because of her apparent business dealings with Robert Mugabe, arguably Africa’s most heinous dictator, a man with a track record of using violence and murder against his opponents.

Much has already been written about Nalinee, her alleged business ties to Mugabe and his wife, the implications of her being on theUSblacklist and her refusal to admit any wrongdoing or resign to spare the nation any further controversy and embarrassment. Beyond those issues, the most interesting questions are who chose her for this new post and why?

One guess is that Nalinee was hand-picked by Thaksin himself (as is probably the case with a number of new appointees) precisely because of her special African “experience.” Since his self-imposed exile, Thaksin has been involved in a number of ventures on the continent, as part of the ongoing expansion of his business empire. A recent article that discussed Thaksin’s dubious role in a failed South African mining venture, concluded that “Thaksin Shinawatra, one of Thailand’s most influential and controversial business and political figures and a fugitive from Thai justice, is said to be looking increasingly to the African continent to build his already considerable fortune.”

Who’s better to help build this fortune and explore similar opportunities – as a “trade representative” - than a woman who, if the US allegations are true, is definitely not afraid to get her hands dirty? Among other things, Mugabe has been accused by critics of using conflict gems to finance his human rights abuses; Nalinee, in turn, stands accused by the US of facilitating “gem-related transactions” on behalf of the Mugabes. That has been enough of an embarrassment for the Thai government that even members of the ruling Pheu Thai party have called on Nalinee to resign. Her steadfast refusal raises the question as to what influential person is supporting her – is it Thaksin himself who’s got her back?

In fact, the Nalinee fiasco raises a rather nasty question: Exactly what role have conflict gems played in bankrolling Thaksin’s various political activities in Thailand? Did blood diamonds help to pay for the 2010 red shirt rallies, other UDD and Pheu Thai activities – and even the party’s 2011 election campaign? If they did, what does that mean for Thai politics? And what does it mean when a shady operator like Nalinee can enjoy such a prominent role in the current Thai government – or did someone slip up, and the mistake will be fixed Thaksin-style: she’ll be “reshuffled” out of the current cabinet in 6 months’ time?

In Part 2, we take a look at Natthawut Saikua, whose appointment to a cabinet-level position raises a simple and fundamental question: Does a charge of terrorism have any meaning inThailand?

All the villagers are happy and red. But what about those who arent? (photo by Bangkok Post)

Thailand’s “Red Villages” have been making news over the past year. First organized by local UDD affiliates around Udon Thani and Khon Kaen provinces, they have been sprouting throughout northeastern and centralThailand like little red mushrooms since red-shirt friendly Pheu Thai came to power in August 2011.

In order to become “red,” a village will declare itself loyal to the “ideals” promoted by the UDD – or in practice, loyal to the UDD itself. Red flags are planted on homes and roads to stake the territorial claim, and UDD is given the run of the place in terms of “educating” the populace in the ways of “true democracy.” UDD and other proponents of the Red Village movement insist it a perfectly legitimate expression of democratic aspirations of the villagers.

But to anyone familiar with the basics of democracy – “true” or otherwise – the reality is the exact opposite. The idea of an entire population center declaring fealty to one single political movement is about as undemocratic a concept as you can get – a throwback to 20^th century totalitarianism in places like the Soviet Union, where once upon a time there were villages (and cities, and an entire nation) where everyone lived happily together, waved the same flags, spoke the same words, and thought the same thoughts without a trace of dissent. Except that they didn’t. Such unity was a lie – an illusion created by the state to keep its populace docile and in check.

Today, the red shirts, who absolutely love talking about “waking up” the Thai people, apparently believe that political awakening equals heavy indoctrination (sorry, “education”) and ideological conformity. A cynic might even suggest that rather than introducing the notion of democracy to Thai villagers (a notion that, by the way, has already existed there, however imperfectly, for over 70 years), UDD is instead creating and nurturing centers of militant political support by turning the population against the state through the use of heavy-handed propaganda and providing itself as the only viable ideological alternative.

In a truly democratic nation, an equivalent of the Red Village movement, were it to exist, would be viewed by most people as dangerously extremist, termed illegal by the state and shut down. It is telling that in Thailand, there is neither a mass outcry against this movement nor any action taken by the state to keep it in check.

The lack of any large popular resistance to Red Villages, as well as genuinely eager participation in the movement by some population centers, speaks volumes about the failure of Thai authorities to properly educate its people in the meaning of democracy and freedom. Were Thais better versed in these concepts, they would never believe that a quasi-totalitarian concept like the Red Village could offer them genuine democracy – and they would guard their villages, towns and cities against such basic violations of their rights. 

While a Red Village majority may experience political fulfillment on a group level, individuals will suffer. It is not possible that 100% of any population center, even one as small as a village, ever supports one political party or movement; but the Red Village operates on that basic principle – that either all villagers support UDD and its “ideals” or it is acceptable to impose such a show of support on an entire village if its majority demands it.

In a society like Thailand’s, where there’s already strong social pressure to conform, especially in a rural environment, anyone who has their doubts about red shirts, and certainly anyone who may be hostile to them, will have no choice but to either conform to the majority’s will or leave. Already, after the July general election, there was a report of villagers in Khon Kaen being verbally harassed and ostracized for voting Democrat. Imagine what would happen during the next election if anyone votes for a party not sanctioned by the UDD in a Red Village (which, for the time being, means, not voting for Pheu Thai).

In fact, could any future election held in a Red Village still be free and fair? Could opposition candidates campaign there? Could individuals speak out against the UDD or Pheu Thai without fear? What if someone changes their mind and wants to take the red flag down from his or her home – will they need permission or authorization to do so? Will they go on a “black list” afterwards? Will they be watched, harassed, threatened? What if a Red Village becomes less “red” and some of its members decide they want to quit in opposition to majority wishes? These are fundamental questions about freedom and individual liberty that must be addressed if this movement is allowed to exist in a democratic nation.

The American Founding Fathers referred to a scenario where the majority imposes its will on an a minority as the “tyranny of the majority” – and it is something they wished to avoid for their new nation, as they considered it to in direct contradiction to basic principles of democracy – as true democracy is much about protecting minority rights as it is about respecting the will of the majority.

Of course, since some of the UDD’s leaders were schooled more in the principles Maoism than Western democracy, it is only fitting that they apply totalitarian groupthink to their movement and pass it off to the public as “democracy”. Modern totalitarian movements and regimes have all paid lip service to democracy and held regular sham elections where the charade of following the “people’s will” was faithfully played out. Is this the future that the UDD (and those behind it) want for Thailand?

It is true that Thai society, especially at the rural level, is still struggling with remnants of feudalism. The UDD may talk on and on about “waking people up” and offering them “true” democracy, but it seems more likely that they want to replace one form of feudalism with another – one where they, and not the state – play the role of the overlord.

For this to be avoided, the democratic credentials of any Red Village must be rigorously tested. Authorities must ensure that any future poll held there be free and fair, and that the opposition can visit there, talk to whomever they like and make their case without fear or prejudice. Villagers should be able to express their political beliefs as they please, which includes freely challenging the UDD, its “ideals’ or even the notion that their village should be “red.” And any “education” offered by the UDD must offer its “students” a chance to think for themselves, not just blindly follow their anti-state propaganda. Only then can we say that Red Villages offer enough liberty to their residents to remain a legitimate part of Thailand’s democratic landscape.

"If youre an asshole and you know it, raise your hand!" (Photo by Tawatchai Kemgumnerd, Bangkok Post)

In a recent interview with the Bangkok Post, hardline red-shirt leader Arisman Pongruangrong, who turned himself in to the DSI last week after spending more than a year on the run from Thai justice, has made a number of statements typical of the man’s complete disconnect from reality. Hilariously, he proclaimed that “I have exercised my constitutional right to demand democracy.”

OK, either the man is confusing the phrases “constitutional right to demand democracy” with “pathological need to create chaos,” or he is referring to a number of special Secret Articles of the Thai Constitution that no one else knows about, which may or may not include:

Secret Article 1001: “Leading armed gangs into the National Parliament is legal so long as you use sharpened bamboo sticks as weapons.”

Secret Article 1002: “Threatening a police officer with a gun is permitted so long as you look dashing in your red outfit (or at least, think you do).”

Secret Article 1003: “Violently disrupting gatherings of international delegates at seaside hotels is not at all a problem so long as you’re a fading ex-crooner who was once able to belt out popular Thai tunes.

Secret Article 1004: “Inciting the public to bring one million liters of gasoline to the nation’s capital in order to commit mass arson is fully sanctioned so long as the amounts are limited to one liter per person.”

Who knows, perhaps these articles are genuine in a constitution that exists somewhere in the confines of Arisman’s head, but sadly, there’s usually little hope for justice in Thailand for high-profile VIP criminal suspects no matter how insane or deluded they appear to be – and that would include most red- and yellow-shirt leaders. With Arisman rightfully denied bail upon his return, there is at least a small measure of hope that justice will prevail, and this violent sociopath will remain in jail until a proper trial can lay bare the crimes he has committed against his own nation and its people.

Published as a letter in The Bangkok Post and The Nation

One must say takes a certain level of chutzpah (or cynicism) to maintain such an obvious charade and in such stubborn opposition to truth and common sense – since both Yingluck’s supporters and detractors know well who actually orchestrates the actions of her government. It’s as if the government and (at least a large portion of) the Thai public are playing a version of the old Soviet game of “We’ll pretend to tell you the truth, and you’ll pretend to believe it.”

There’s also an occasional headlines where Thaksin himself joins in the fray to “demand” something or other, sort of spoiling the charade a little…but not really. Still, the juxtaposition of Thaksin “demanding” a clean cabinet on the same day as Yingluck insists that such a cabinet is “made in Thailand” is particularly eye-rollerrific.

A few other doozies are highlighted in red. Denying a “link” between Thaksin and government? How do you deny something so fundamental with a straight face? Of course, Thaksin denies he’s even involved in politics (again!) - after demanding a “clean” cabinet (and then meeting with members of that cabinet overseas, not to mention foreign heads of state); but Bangkok Post begs to differ with a “Thaksin shows who’s boss” headline.

Also, NO PLANS for Thaksin to get his passport back or change the consitution for his benefit. Really.

Thai PM-elect denies Thaksin picking cabinet (AFP, August 4, 2011)

Yingluck: Cabinet ‘made in Thailand’  (Bangkok Post, August 4, 2011)

Thaksin demands a ‘clean’ cabinet (Bangkok Post, August 4, 2011)

Pheu Thai: No intervention in cabinet (Bangkok Post, August 9, 2011)

PM denies trade envoy report (Bangkok Post, August 14, 2011)

No plan to get Thaksin a new passport, says Yingluck  (The Nation, August 14, 2011)

PM denies govt’s involvement in Interpol’s cancellation of arrest warrant for Thaksin  (TAN NETWORK, August 15, 2011)

Thaksin to Lecture in Japan, PM Denies Plan to Return Her Brother’s Passport (TAN NETWORK, August 15, 2011)

PM Affirms No Special Treatment for Thaksin (TAN NETWORK, August 16, 2011) 

Thaksin tells Japanese media he had a hand in arranging Cabinet line-up; denies talking about return to Thailand  (TAN NETWORK, August 16, 2011)

Yingluck denies linkage between Thaksin and govt (The Nation, August 17, 2011)

PM Denies Planning Charter Changes for Thaksin (TAN NETWORK, August 17, 2011)

PM shirks question if charter change aims to benefit Thaksin (The Nation, August 18, 2011)

Yingluck and Noppadon deny Thaksin has been staying in Phnom Penh (The Nation, August 21, 2011)

Premier Dismisses Claims of Thaksin’s Influence (TAN NETWORK, August 22, 2011)

Noppadon denies reports Thaksin will be investing in oil excavation in Cambodia (TAN NETWORK, August 22, 2011)

Charter change ‘not for Thaksin’ (Bangkok Post, August 23, 2011)

Thaksin denies meddling in politics (Bangkok Post, August 23, 2011)

Thaksin ‘not involved’ in reshuffle (Bangkok Post, August 23, 2011)

PM denies speeding up pardon process for Thaksin (NNT, September 5, 2011)

Govt Denies Amnesty Push for Thaksin (TAN Network, September 6, 2011)

Chalerm insists no part of decree blocks Thaksin seeking amnesty (Bangkok Post, September 7, 2011)

No hidden agenda behind Yingluck’s visit to Brunei, officials insist (The Nation, September 8, 2011)

Ministry Denies Preparing Special Jail for Thaksin (TAN Network, September 9, 2011)

Thitima: PM’s trip no hidden agenda (Bangkok Post, September 13, 2011)

Yingluck distances govt from Thaksin pardon (Bangkok Post, September 13, 2011)

Thaksin and Hun Sen deny bilateral issues on agenda (The Nation, September 18, 2011)

Yingluck denies Thaksin gave orders to Cabinet (The Nation, September 22, 2011)

Thaksin skypes Pheu Thai ministers to offer ‘support’ (The Nation, September 23, 2011)

Yingluck denies home buyer scheme will aid her old firm (Bangkok Post, September 23, 2011)

Thaksin shows who’s the boss (Bangkok Post, September 23, 2011)

There’s no more denying who runs the show (Bangkok Post, October 1, 2011)

Oh…but there will be!

Scenic, but no longer sufficent (photo by Bangkok Dave)

From the day BTS extended its Sukhumvit Line from On Nut to Bearing, the rush-hour commute on that line has become… well, unbearable. With a reported 100,000 additional daily commuters using the extended line, every train headed in the direction of Bangkok’s Central Business District is now crowded beyond capacity and can no longer handle many of the passengers waiting on the platform. Many commuters have to let one or two trains pass before they are lucky enough to be able to board. This used to happen once in awhile. Now it’s the becoming the frustrating norm.

BTS has announced that it will tackle the overcrowding by adding two trains to its rush hour schedule. That’s right: not adding two cars to each train; not even adding two trains per hour – adding just two extra trains during an entire rush hour period.

The only possible response to this, save for a barrage of unprintable obscenities, is, “They’ve got to be joking!”

For some time now, and long before the extension to Bearing, Sukhumvit Line trains have been getting more and more congested, especially during peak hours and on weekends. The reasons are simple: the number of passengers using the line has grown dramatically – but the trains haven’t.

Enter if you can! (photo by @torrentabuse)

Since it began its Skytrain service in 1999, BTS has operated only short 3-car trains on the Sukhumvit Line. This made sense 12 years ago, when only 200,000 passengers made the daily trip, and it wasn’t yet clear how successful the service would become. But within a few years, passenger numbers had risen to 500,000 per day – and longer trains became first, more desirable, and later, a real necessity. Last year, BTS began operating new 4-car trains on the Silom Line, but the longer and more passenger-heavy Sukhumvit Line was left with its older 3-car units.

But as BTS proudly unveiled its extension on that already overburdened line, it had made no corresponding provisions to cope with the extra passenger load. The announced addition of two extra trains during rush hour is an absurdly inadequate response to the congestion problem – way too little and much too late.

The only thing that can alleviate the overcrowding now is the addition of more cars to each train. That could be done in a number of ways: first, by adding a 1-2 trailer (middle) cars to existing trains. Last year, Siemens, the maker of trains operating on the Sukhumvit Line, had agreed to provide additional trailer cars to its units, but it’s unclear what happened to this arrangement, as BTS has made no recent mention of it.

Another solution would be to bring some of the new 4-car Bombardier trains BTS operates on the Silom Line over to the Sukhumvit Line, but the Chinese-made trains have had a number of technical issues over the past few months, so BTS may be reluctant to expand their service. BTS should also be able to make some of its 3-car trains into a 6-car unit by connecting the motor car of one unit to that of the other. Many commuter trains are lengthened in this manner – and all BTS stations were built to handle a 6-car train, so the new train length will be perfectly in line with the stations’ design.

BTS: Better Than a can of Sardines? (photo by @elgrodo)

For now, BTS would only need to lengthen some of its trains (probably, every third arrival) during rush hour to alleviate passenger congestion. Unless BTS has absolutely no train units to spare, it is hard to understand why they won’t apply this solution at once.

For the past 12 years BTS has provided a vital, and, for the most part, efficient service to Bangkok’s commuters. That’s why it’s so disheartening to watch it flounder this time, unable to deal with a problem that should’ve been entirely predictable and planned for.

One thing is clear: BTS can’t continue operating a light-rail network in an urban area of over 15 million people using trains designed for service in a small town – or an amusement park. With the new government promising 10 new Skytrain routes, it’s difficult to see how BTS will be able to cope with such major changes if it can’t even manage an extension of one line by a mere 5 stations.

There’s no longer any choice. BTS and its customers need trains that reflect the reality of their environment – and they need them now.

Yingluck Shinawatra has just been officially endorsed as Thailand’s first female prime minister. Her election may well be historic, but is it any sort of victory for feminism?

Based on the circumstances of Yingluck’s rise to power, that seems highly unlikely. First, both Yingluck’s supporters and opponents agree that she wouldn’t exist as a political entity if not for her big brother, the ex-fugitive billionaire PM Thaksin Shinawatra, who picked her from obscurity as the best proxy, or, in his own words, “clone,” to represent not just his varied interests, but himself personally, at the helm ofThailand’s new government.

And it would appear that Yingluck has accepted the task at hand to fulfill Thaksin’s wishes – which wouldn’t be the first time she’s had to cover for her big brother. After all, the allegations of perjury in a corruption case involving Thaksin are still hanging over her head. As Thaksin had effectively raised Yingluck as his daughter, and as she has risen to wealth and success inside his business empire, it’s fair to say that the family ties that bind the siblings probably trump all other considerations for Yingluck.

Finally, while 48% of the electorate may’ve voted Yingluck into office, the majority of those votes were for Thaksin in absentia. It is difficult to imagine Yingluck winning the hearts of even half the nation had it not been for her last name. Yes, she was a good candidate: pleasant, charismatic, photogenic – but from start to finish, she was a creature of her brother and his male handlers – there is little to her victory that’s purely hers.

After an exhausting and protracted political crisis, most Thais probably want to put the best face on this election result and see it as a measure of progress. But the bottom line is Yingluck had won not as a woman or a candidate in her own right, but as Thaksin’s pretty stand-in. It was a victory – but not for feminism.

But with the election now over, the hard work of putting together the new administration begins, and with it, the inevitable discussion of who’s really running the show and making key decisions. In the media, this has led to a string of rather awkward headlines based around the theme of Yingluck denying Thaksin’s role in key decision-making and insisting she’s functioning independently. Read together, these headlines (mostly from the local dailies) make an interesting statement. The question is how much and how quickly will this list of headlines grow in the coming days and weeks.

“It’s Yingluck in name only: Heavy hand of elder brother Thaksin will still show up in cabinet picks” (Bangkok Post, July 28, 2011)

“Yingluck denies approaching outsiders” (Bangkok Post, July 26, 2011)

“I’ll pick my own cabinet: Yingluck Insists” (The Nation, July 25, 2011)

“Thaksin not involved in forming new government: Yingluck” (Pattaya Mail, July 25, 2011)

“Let Yingluck decide” (Bangkok Post, July 20, 2011)

“Yingluck’s mission is to prove she is no puppet” (Bangkok Post, July 18, 2011)

“Pheu Thai: Yingluck the only PM candidate” (Bangkok Post, July 14, 2011)

“Thaksin, Red Shirts Cast Shadow Over Yingluck Government” (The Nation, July 12, 2011)

“Thaksin meetings in Dubai not about Cabinet posts, says Yingluck” (The Nation, July 11, 2011)

“Yingluck denies Thaksin’s involvement” (Bangkok Post, July 9, 2011)

“I’m not Thaksin’s puppet, insists Yingluck” (AP News, July 8, 2011)

“Yingluck denies she’ll visit Thaksin” (Bangkok Post, July 8, 2011)

“Yingluck ensures she has the last word” (Bangkok Post, July 8, 2011)

“Yingluck: No job for Thaksin” (Bangkok Post, July 6, 2011) 

“Yingluck’s first challenge: prove you are not a puppet” (The Nation, July 4, 2011)

In the wake of Thailand’s general election came the inevitable allegations of voting irregularities, including vote-buying. Vote-buying is an endemic problem inThailand, part and parcel of its political culture and a major symptom of the wider corruption prevalent in its society. Some vote-buying occurs among the urban poor, but mainly it’s an issue that affects the rural population, especially in Isaan, the key center of support for Thaksin and his Pheu Thai (PT) party, the winners of the July 3 poll.

A few things published on the subject post-election caught my attention in the local English-language press. An exposé piece in Bangkok Post’s Spectrum section implicated the Democrats (without naming them) in handing out money to residents of a low-income housing project in Bangkok. A resident who was interviewed admitted to taking money from a ‘canvasser’ but then voting PT. What was interesting was not that the Democrats were allegedly buying votes. All parties in Thailand engage in vote buying, though it’s generally accepted that Democrats are the ‘least worst’ offenders.

What was interesting was that the sellers (or voters) appear to be accept money from one party but voting for another. This is nothing new; The Nation’s then-columnist Chang Noi discussed this phenomenon three years ago. His piece and the example above undercut the notion that vote-sellers are simply voting according to how they’re paid; at least those in urban slums seem to vote how they like – while accepting payments from other parties.

What is also interesting is that no explicit demands were made nor promises extracted. The Democrats’ strategy in allegedly buying votes appeared to be insurance against wholesale defeat rather than an expectation of victory. In any event, the party won Bangkok, but this is unlikely to be due to any votes they may have bought in the slums.

In the villages, however, more sinister forces appear to be at work. An interesting piece from Andrew Biggs in the Bangkok Post laid out the mechanics of vote-buying in central Thailand, which included using death threats to enforce voting for the right candidate. Money is handed out, including a whopping 60% cut to the middleman, but if the results don’t tally up, part of that money is demanded back. If the candidate gets a low tally or loses, death threats are made. Whether they are enforced or not was not made clear, but considering the fact that the vote seller in Biggs’ piece appeared to be on the run and political violence is not exactly a rare phenomenon in Thailand, one suspects that sometimes they are.

Violations of Rural Voters’ Rights

Finally, a series of letters from regular contributors in The Nation discuss a different type of vote-related abuse, one where voters in a Roi Et village, in a clear and serious violation of their rights, were allegedly instructed by election officials to sign their ballots. The votes were then made public, and those villagers identified as having voted for Democrats in this PT stronghold were verbally abused and ostracized by their neighbors.

Needless to say, no vote that took place under such circumstances be considered ‘free and fair’ – and if the practice of signing ballots was not an isolated incident but is in, in fact, widespread and systematic, it needs to be exposed and stopped. Obviously, any electoral bodies that certified signed ballots did so falsely and broke the law. Re-votes may have to be held in the affected areas.

Of course, if re-votes were to be held, the social pressure to vote with the majority would still exist. Those who voted the ‘wrong way’ the first time might to be expected to ‘vote right’ if given a second chance. They might bow to pressure to avoid further harassment.

Nevertheless, canceling votes not cast freely and fairly this time and punishing those who broke the law is essential to preventing future abuses; it is the only way to strengthen Thailand’s democracy.

Red Shirt Make Threats – Business as Usual

Unfortunately, the post-election relief everyone in Thailand is currently experiencing is masking some very tense political undercurrents. If widespread voting abuses were uncovered, especially among the PT candidates, and the election results were challenged, there would be an immediate backlash from the red shirts, who will view any such challenge as a direct threat to what they consider their victory. Red shirt leaders have openly said as much.

Any attempt to question the election results, no matter how valid, good-intentioned or legally sound, will certainly bring the red shirts back into the streets, with demands that ‘democratic results’ be respected. Everyone knows this, and most likely, EC and others are treading carefully, not looking for too many problems that can cause them grief.

This might explain why the noteworthy thing about this election is not the slew of vote-related violations, but their apparent absence. The EC has not yet certified all the winners, but so far only minor case of vote-buying has been brought up and no one has been disqualified for vote-buying or other irregularities (of course, this may change in the coming days).

Corrupt Habits v Democratic Results

More interestingly, few commentators, either foreign or domestic, have touched on the issue of voting violations, making it seem that this was, at least as far as the media was concerned, a relatively clean election.

Maybe it was. Or maybe the story of the election itself has trumped everything else. Journalists and commentators have been marveling at Yingluck Shinawatra’s (and her Dubai-based sibling’s) big win and all its implications. Many have stuck to the rather limited and one-sided narrative that this election represented an almost mythical ‘return to democracy,’ so exploring the mechanics of the vote that led up to this very democratic result might feel a bit awkward.

As I see it, some journalists and commentators are dismissing or ignoring talks of voting violations as the grumbling of the hated ‘elites,’ a way for the establishment to de-legitimize the will of the Thai people, to deprive them of their voice, to piss on their democratic aspirations. Most others probably guess that whatever violations have occurred are not important, as they wouldn’t have affected the outcome of the election anyway.

They are wrong on both counts.

Vote buying, ballot signing and other irregularities make a mockery of genuine democracy, and those in the media who have decided to turn a blind eye to these violations because it clashes with the story in their heads of democracy triumphing in Thailand are betraying their own stated ideals.

Meanwhile, if all the vote buying was similar to what allegedly went at that one Bang Khen slum in the Bangkok Post piece, it might indeed be a small matter. But if people’s habits have been thoroughly corrupted, if their lives are being threatened over how they vote, and if this happens regularly and systematically across the Thai countryside, how could anyone think this is unimportant to Thai democracy?

Unethical and Undemocratic

Chang Noi was right that people shouldn’t dismiss election results because of vote buying, but he was dead wrong in asserting that electoral democracy works just fine with vote buying. It has corrupted the politicians and voters alike, making a direct exchange of money for votes an inextricable part of what is meant to be a democratic process, and alienated a large segment of the Thai population that doesn’t engage in the practice.

The middle classes and other mostly urban voters have come to view Thailand’ election results as at least in part illegitimate because of how votes are bought and sold in the countryside. This is not unfair. Those who support democracy and the rights of rural voters in Thailand should not dismiss such concerns as simply the establishment fighting to maintain its privileges. Just as the middle classes need to accept rural voters’ democratic aspirations, rural voters (and their supporters) need to understand that the patronage system that buys and sells votes in their homes is unethical, undemocratic and destructive to the fabric of their society.

Thaksin Shinawatra is not involved in politics. His sister Yingluck Shinawatra, who has just been elected as Thailand’s prime minister on a ticket of her big brother’s Pheu Thai (PT) party, does not take orders from him. Talks in Dubai (or is it Brunei?) that involve Thaksin and prominent Thai politicians are not about cabinet posts – they’re about “personal” matters (or… tigers, possibly).

These are examples of recent public statements made by newly-elect Yingluck (except for the part about the tigers), and it almost goes without say that they are all false. Actually, not just false – blatantly, absurdly, patently false. So false that even Yingluck’s supporters hardly doubt their falsehood, whether they admit it or not.

For Yingluck to earnestly state that Thaksin is not involved in politics and suggest that she has not been elected as his proxy is to challenge our most fundamental grasp on reality. Were Thaksin not politically involved, would Yingluck exist as a PM candidate? Who picked her, a businesswoman with no experience in party politics, to represent her exiled brother’s party over scores of long-time party operatives and seasoned politicians? Whose people worked to elect her? Why did her supporters vote for her? What were their expectations? If “Thaksin thinks, Pheu Thai does” as the party’s slogan says, what does PT actually “do” if the source of the thinking is not involved in politics?

No one is asking these ridiculous questions because no one needs to. Everyone in Thailand knows that Thaksin is very much involved in politics and has picked his sister to be his proxy, “clone”, representative, what-have-you, as a way for his party to win Thailand’s general election (done!) – and consequently, look for a way to get back into power (…not quite done).

But the funny thing about Yingluck’s pronouncements is not that they are obvious lies. The funny thing is no one reacts to these lies with amazement, dismay or outrage; frankly, so far, few people appear to care. Yingluck’s opponents know she’s lying, but feel nothing – because they expect nothing else; meanwhile, her supporters and those more sympathetic to her perhaps understand her need to keep up appearances and are not too troubled by the dearth of truth in her public statements.

Perhaps the facts that Yingluck was elected so decisively and is about to become Thailand’s first female PM makes it bad form to ruin the moment by harping on the fact that she’s lying through her pretty teeth.

But in all fairness, these are not little white lies that she’s telling. These are whoppers; they’re lies that fundamentally distort the basics of who she is and what she’s doing in office. Yingluck is not lying about things that could plausibly be true; she’s not lying about things we might only suspect of being untrue; she’s lying about things we know absolutely and definitely to be untrue; things that no one should have to lie about because the truth is so self-evident.

Yingluck might as well state that she herself is not involved in politics or that Thailand’s election was “personal” business.

Well, in a way, the last part may be true, as politics can indeed be very personal business – and for Thaksin, seeking a way to reclaim power is about as personal as it gets.

But the casual manner in which Yingluck makes her big lies has to be a little disconcerting. After all, she’s being pursued by allegations of perjury (which, after all, is a form of lying), as her testimony in a corruption case involving her brother was shown by the court’s verdict to be false. So it would appear that is not the first time Yingluck has lied on her big brother’s behalf; she certainly seems fairly experienced at it. But what else will she be lying about? Or better still, Can we expect any truth in her public statements at all?

In any event, so far, Yingluck hasn’t had too hard of a time from Thailand’s journalists, pundits and political observers. Perhaps some sympathetic commentators believe Yingluck’s “fibs” are cancelled out by the lies and “crimes” of her predecessors and are, therefore, either unimportant or morally justifiable. Or maybe, lying has simply become so endemic to Thai politics and society that even those who don’t support Yingluck find it difficult to make an issue of it.

It might just be a little too soon to criticize Yingluck. Let her enjoy her honeymoon with Thailand; everyone is too exhausted from the current political crisis anyway; why start a fight over something so relatively minor – after all, what’s a few lies compared to blood in the streets?

Whatever the case, everyone had better start getting used the “Thaksin is not involved in politics/is not running my government” line in all its permutations, variations and forms from now on – there’s going to be plenty more where that came from.